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Abstract
I review two papers, addressing the issue of competition and quality determination in the market
for Internet access services (Crémer, Rey, and Tirole (2000), Foros and Hansen (2001)). These
two works come to seemingly opposite conclusions. After having summarized the two papers, I
try to highlight what lies behind the differences in the results.
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1 Introduction
Two papers have recently addressed the issue of competition and quality
determination in the market for Internet access services. The first paper is by Crémer,
Rey, and Tirole, published in the Journal of Industrial Economics (2000). The second
paper is by Foros and Hansen, published in Information Economics and Policy
(2001).
Interestingly, these two works come to seemingly opposite conclusions:
whereas the first authors find that the bigger operators may want to degrade the
quality of interconnections between networks (e.g., by lowering the capacity of
interfaces), the second authors suggest that vertically differentiated firms, of different
size, do not have conflicting interests with regard to interconnection quality.
The two models adopt different assumptions regarding, in particular, the effect
of quality on the market dimension, the degree of firms’ differentiation, and the nature
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2of strategic instruments. Nonetheless, their findings are comparable, especially if
vertical differentiation in the Foros-Hansen model is interpreted as the effect of the
size of an installed base of customers.
In this review, I provide a summary of these two works and then I try to make
a synthesis of the different positions, with the aim of highlighting what lies behind the
differences in the results. I claim that the difference is driven by alternative
hypotheses on the overall market size, which is variable in first paper but fixed in the
second one.
Since Internet is an expanding business, the first approach seems to be more
realistic. Nonetheless, it fails to address the heterogeneity of network services and the
dynamic implications of the growing number of Internet subscribers.
2 Paper #1: Connectivity in the Commercial Internet
The first paper deals with the “backbone” market in the Internet. Backbones constitute
the top layer of the Internet hierarchical structure: users send/receive data to/from
service providers (ISPs), then the providers communicate between themselves mainly
through high-speed, high-capacity backbone connections.
Backbones are traditionally operated on the basis of “bill and keep” schemes:
they reciprocally accept to route all traffic that is destined to their own customers
(exchanged through public or private interfaces), and there are no charges applied
between backbone operators.
Crémer, Rey, and Tirole stress, “connectivity requires cooperation among
firms that are otherwise competitors. They must reach bilateral agreements on the
locations and capacities of interfaces, and on the financial terms through which they
exchange traffic”. The paper focuses on the determinants of these agreements,
highlighting the role played by the installed base of customers. To this end, the
authors adopt and adapt the well-known model by Katz and Shapiro (1985).
The simplest version of the model considers a duopoly, in which the quality of
service of backbone i, affecting the users willingness to pay1, is specified as:
(1) si = v[( i + qi)+ ( j + qj)]
                                                
1 Consumer surplus is defined as CS = T + si – pi, where the parameter T  is uniformly
distributed in the population, giving raise to an aggregate linear demand curve.
3where v is a valuation parameter, the s refer to the number of pre-existing users, and
the qs stand for the number of new users, subscribing either to backbone i or to j.  is
a parameter, reflecting the quality of interconnection. It is comprised between zero
and one: if it is zero, users of the backbone j are unreachable by i-users; if it is one,
there are no qualitative differences between inter- and intra-backbone connections.
The duopolists play the following game: first, they independently choose a
value for the parameter , and the lower value determines the actual interconnection
quality; second, they set quantities (à la Cournot) for backbone services, so that new
users choose where to subscribe, with no a priori preferences (in equilibrium, the
choice is driven by an indifference condition, if both qs are s rictly positive).
Some remarks are in order here. Old users are captive and the competition is
for attracting new subscribers. The authors justify this choice with the existence of
large switching costs. However, if the subscription is a long term engagement, the
users choice would be better specified in an intertemporal context. Indeed, the authors
shows that, when connectivity is not perfect, the largest backbone becomes dominant
in the market for new users. This would mean that the large operator becomes larger
over time. Non-myopic users may anticipate all this and subscribe immediately to the
main operator.
The authors demonstrate that the largest backbone chooses a lower
interconnection quality, since this is a decreasing function of the difference in size of
the installed bases. This result is due to two effects. First, a better interconnection
quality raises the users’ valuation of both backbones (because of network
externalities, there is a demand expansion effect). Second, the two networks become
more similar when connectivity is improved (the small network gains more in terms
of access2, that is, a differentiation effect). Since the two mechanisms influence the
largest operator’s profits in opposite ways, whereas they are both positive for the
small backbone, the former chooses a lower interconnection quality (thereby
determining the actual quality).
This insight is confirmed in a series of variant of the basic model in which: (1)
quality is chosen cooperatively in a Nash bargain with side transfers, (2) the operators
                                                
2 For example, suppose that one network has 50 subscribers and another one 100. If
they choose to interconnect (perfectly), the smaller network can offer access to 150
subscribers (+200% from its own base), whereas the bigger network can expand its
access potential by only 50%.
4play Bertrand in last stage of the game, (3) quality is endogenously determined on the
basis of a chosen interface capacity, giving rise to traffic congestion.
The authors then turn to a more elaborated version of the model, considering
four competitors that are initially assumed to have equal market shares. Because of
this initial symmetry, none of the competitors would have incentives to set a poor
interconnection quality. A merger between two operators is subsequently considered.
The question then becomes: does the merger induce the largest operator to act anti-
competitively, through a deterioration of its interconnection quality?
Observe that, by lowering quality in one interface, a large operator could
benefit from a differentiation effect, but at the same time both interconnected
backbones would loose demand vis-à-vis all other operators.
The authors claim that the big backbone would never choose a “global
deterioration strategy”, that is, lowering quality in all its interfaces. Instead, a
“targeted degradation strategy”, that is, directed towards only one of the smaller
competitors, is said to be profitable: “If the other backbone does not provide any
transit services,” (and the paper discusses at length why this may indeed be the case)
“the degradation strategy creates an asymmetry between the dominant backbone (who
can offer access to three-fourth of the installed base) and the target (who can offer
access to only half of the installed base).
3 Paper #2: Competition and Compatibility among Internet Service
Providers
The second paper consider a situation very similar to the duopoly model in the first
paper, although the authors make no explicit reference to the backbone infrastructure,
but only to some generic “service providers” (ISPs), giving access to the Internet.
Here, however, services are both vertically and horizontally differentiated.
Following a conventional Hotelling framework, two competitors are virtually located
at the two extremes of a segment, along which consumers with unitary demand are
uniformously distributed. The utility obtained by a consumer, located in x and
subscribing to an ISP i, located in xi, is defined as
3:
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in (1).
5(2) Ui = wi + tx - xi + v(qi + qj ) - pi
where: w is an “intrinsic” quality parameter, t is the Hotelling transport factor,
v is a valuation parameter, q stands for the number of subscribers of network i or j,
 is the parameter of interconnection quality, as in (1), and pi is the subscription fee.
As usual, each consumer chooses the network associated with the highest utility level.
Parameters values are set in such a way that all consumers subscribe to one of the two
ISPs. It is also assumed that there exists a consumer located at the boundary of the
two market areas, which is indifferent about subscribing one network or the other (the
authors focus only on interior solutions).
A game is played by the two firms. First, they cooperatively choose the level
of the quality parameter in the range 0-1 (0 = disconnected networks, 1 = fully
integrated networks). Second, they autonomously set (à la Bertrand) the subscription
fees.







+ (wi - wj) - (pi - pj )
= 1/(2t - 2v(1- ))
Therefore, a better interconnection quality (or a lower sensitivity to network
externalities) turns out to be equivalent to a higher degree of product differentiation.
This implies that the two operators will choose the highest interconnection quality if
this gives raise to negligible investment costs.
More surprisingly, the marginal profit associated to a change in the quality is
equal for the two firms, which therefore always agree when choosing the
characteristics of the network interface. This result comes from the overlapping of two
effects: a price effect, which is positive for both ISPs (because a higher quality raises
the consumers’ valuation), and a market share effect, which has opposite sign for the
two operators. In particular, the market share of the smaller network increases and the
market share of the bigger network decreases. The first effect is dominant and
sufficiently larger, for the bigger operator, to ensure the equality in the marginal
profits.
When the costs of interconnection quality are increasing and convex, the
quality level is found by equating marginal profits and marginal investment costs. The
level chosen by the two competitors can then be compared with the socially optimal
6one, obtained by maximizing customer gross surplus minus total production cost.
In this model the quality level chosen by the two firms exceeds the socially
optimal one. This is due to a strategic externality. Each firm raises its price twice:
because of higher consumers’ valuations, and because of the other competitor’s price
increase (prices are strategic complements).
4 A Synthesis
Different results are driven by different hypotheses, but not all differences are directly
responsible for dissimilar (qualitative) findings.
Some diversity in basic assumptions is more superficial than substantial. For
example, Crémer, Rey and Tirole consider only competition for new customers,
whereas – in principle – customers may switch network in the Foros and Hansen
paper. However, it is sufficient to reinterpret the quality differential w in th  latter
paper as the valuation of the installed base (locked-in), and the consumers distributed
in the Hotelling segment as new subscribers, to make the two models directly
comparable in this respect.
Another obvious difference regards the nature of instruments (quantity vs.
price) used in the second stage of the game, after the selection of the interconnection
quality. It may be useful to think about the impact of an improved quality on profits as
coming from two sources: the higher customers’ valuation, and the change in the
strategic behavior of the competitor. This secondary effect is different in the two
cases, because quantities are strategic substitutes, whereas prices are strategic
complements.
Still, this is not the primary determinant of the different outcomes, since in
both cases the competitor who get a differential advantage gains a larger market share.
The key element is the market expansion effect, triggered by a quality enhancement:
this is present in the first paper, where an aggregate demand function (sensitive to
quality) is used, but absent in the second paper, where the total number of subscribers
is constant.
To see this, consider  a simple variant of the Hotelling duopoly, in which the
two markets are detached and there may be consumers not subscribing to either
7network4. When quality is improved, new customers may be captured by the two ISPs,
so each individual market expands. However, since the smaller network always gains
relatively more, in terms of access to network clients, it has also more incentives to
improve the interconnection quality. When investment costs are convex, the bigger
network would then prefer a lower quality level, as suggested by Crémer, Rey and
Tirole.
Since the number of subscribers to Internet services is steadily increasing
around the world, and their decision about if and where to subscribe may well be
influenced by price and quality levels, the approach followed in the first paper seems
closer to reality. However, Crémer, Rey and Tirole obtain their results in a static
framework, which may not be appropriate to capture all the implications of a market
whose size is growing over time.
Furthermore, vertical and horizontal differentiation (addressed only in the
Foros and Hansen paper) is an important issue in the Internet. On one hand,
geographical proximity influence the network choice, especially outside North
America, and, on the other hand, backbone services are differentiated in several
aspects (Gorman and Malecki (2000)).
If a variable market dimension is introduced in the Foros-Hansen model, it
may not be true that the operators have equal incentives, with regard to the quality of
interconnection. However, when competition is based on price setting, the insight that
a better interconnection softens the competitive pressure is still valid, possibly
bringing about a “too high” interconnection quality.
In any case, nothing ensures that the network operators autonomously select
the right quality level, from a social point of view. In principle, then, there may be
scope for regulatory intervention, whose analysis is however outside the scope of this
paper. Yet, intervention would be necessary only in the presence of significant
asymmetries between firms. In these circumstances, however, the network providers
would probably prefer to abandon the “bill and keep” scheme, and transform it into a
“transit” contract, in which the smaller network pays the bigger one for access
services. Indeed, many big backbone operators already require that potential partners
in peering agreements must satisfy certain requirements, in terms of: number and
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8characteristics of customers, number and location of interfaces, link capacity, etc.
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